Positive State Obligations Regarding Fundamental Rights and ‘Changing the Hearts and Minds’ by Henrard, K.A.M. (Kristin)
Positive State Obligations Regarding
Fundamental Rights and ‘Changing the
Hearts and Minds’
Kristin Henrard*
Human rights are also called ‘fundamental rights’,
which emphasises the fundamental importance of these
rights and their effective enjoyment. They should
secure for human beings a dignified life, making human
dignity an important underlying principle of human
rights.1 The need for these rights to be effectively
enjoyed, and thus for the effective protection of funda-
mental rights2 has resulted in the identification of an
increasing detail and amount of positive state obliga-
tions,3 also in relation to civil and political rights, that
initially were primarily conceived as ‘defensive rights’,
implying a protection against arbitrary interferences by
public authorities.4
Notwithstanding the common acceptance that states
indeed have a range of positive obligations in relation to
fundamental rights, many difficult questions remain as
to the exact boundaries of these positive obligations.
What can reasonably be expected from public authori-
ties, also in terms of time span in which particular
results should be reached? How do these positive state
obligations relate to the negative state obligations of
non-interference? In this respect, it is surely instructive
to analyse and evaluate what relevant parameters inter-
national human rights courts have identified so far?
These boundary questions and possible tensions with
negative state obligations are particularly an issue con-
cerning these fundamental rights that would require the
eradication of ingrained prejudice and stereotypical
thinking. The fundamental right most centrally
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involved is the prohibition of discrimination, triggering
discussions about how far state obligations go to ensure
an effective protection against discrimination in private
relationships. Particular attention is needed for the
prohibition of discrimination on so-called suspect
grounds, referring to grounds of differentiation that are
not only irrelevant for one’s functioning in society but
also have gone hand in hand with systemic discrimi-
nation.5 Grounds that have a long pedigree as ‘suspect
ground’ include gender and race. Importantly, the iden-
tification of suspect grounds is not static, but dynamic,
in that over time additional grounds are being added to
the list of suspect grounds. To some extent, this is
reflected in the development of conventions focusing on
discrimination on particular (suspect) grounds, such as
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of
All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW,
regarding gender), United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
(CERD, regarding race) and United Nations Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN
CRPD, disability). Nevertheless, there are also grounds
that are (generally) considered as suspect, but that so far
have not generated a distinct convention, such as sexual
orientation and religion.6
In addition to the prohibition of discrimination, funda-
mental rights that imply state obligations to respect and
protect one’s distinct identity are relevant here as these
also point to state obligations to counter stereotypes and
prejudice in relation to these distinct identities. Minori-
ty-specific rights, and their intrinsic concern with the
right to respect for a distinct ethnic, religious and or lin-
guistic identity, on the one hand, and substantive, real
equality, on the other, are indeed intertwined with the
fight against prejudice and stereotypes. Relatedly, the
interpretation of some general fundamental rights also
point to state duties to respect distinct identity of partic-
ular groups, such as the freedom to manifest one’s
5. See also J. Gerards, ‘Intensity of Judicial Review in Equal Treatment
Cases’, 51 Netherlands International Law Review (2004), 162 et seq.
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1
Kristin Henrard doi: 10.5553/ELR.000167 - ELR July 2020 | No. 3
religion,7 and the right of respect for privacy, family life
and home.8
When having regard to positive state obligations to (aim
to) eradicate ingrained prejudice and stereotypical
thinking, the ultimate question seems to be whether
and, if so, to what extent, states are obliged (to try) to
change people’s hearts and minds. This undoubtedly
controversial question was the subject of an inter-
national conference, organised at the Erasmus
University Rotterdam in January 2020, with the gener-
ous financial support of the Erasmus Trust Fund, the
EUR Initiative of Inclusive Prosperity and ESL’s Rule
of Law research programme.
In order to address this complex question in an appro-
priate manner, three avenues were identified, resulting
in three strands of presentations. The first strand set out
to develop the parameters for such positive state obliga-
tions from a multi-disciplinary perspective, more
particularly combining the parameters visible in the
human rights paradigm, as well as in sociology and eth-
ics. When assessing and evaluating the extent to which
states could be obliged to try to change hearts and
minds, the preliminary non-legal questions about socio-
logical possibilities (can states at all change the way
people think and feel?) and possible ethical constraints
need to be taken into account as well. The second strand
of presentations zoomed in on the time factor involved,
in the sense that countering deep-seated prejudice and
discrimination is a process that takes considerable time,
has a ‘long durée’, and is often not linear. The third
strand of presentations charted the trends that emerge
in the (quasi) jurisprudence of a range of international
human rights courts, when zooming in on particular
vulnerable groups, often targets of prejudice and discri-
mination, more particularly Roma, Muslim minorities
in the Western world, LGBTI and persons with a dis-
ability. Each presentation focused on one particular vul-
nerable group, whilst having regard to various relevant
conventions and related supervisory practice, so as to be
able to paint an overall picture.
This special issue of Erasmus Law Review captures the pre-
sentations and subsequent discussions at the international
conference, and thus reflects the three strands.
The first strand of three articles paints a multi-discipli-
nary picture, by highlighting, respectively, the relevant
parameters of the human rights paradigm (Stephanie
Berry), sociological considerations (Anita Böcker) and
ethical perspectives (Ioanna Tourkochoriti) about state
duties to change the hearts and minds of people in rela-
tion to prejudice. In the first article, Berry reframes the
question as one about ‘A Positive State Obligation to
Counter Dehumanisation under International Human
Rights Law’. She claims that every society has in-
7. The ECtHR has a steady line of jurisprudence in which it underscores
that states should work towards religious harmony and tolerance, and
thus make religions respect one another: see inter alia ECtHR, Metro-
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8. See in this respect the famous reasoning of the ECtHR in the Chapman
v. UK, 18 January 2001, at para. 96.
groups and out-groups, with out-groups being
particularly vulnerable to rights violations by the in-
group. These rights violations are facilitated by the
dehumanisation of the out-group by the in-group. Con-
sequently, she argues that the creation of international
human rights law (IHRL) treaties and corresponding
monitoring mechanisms should be viewed as the first
step towards protecting out-groups from human rights
violations. In this respect, it is essential that IHRL mon-
itoring mechanisms recognise the connection between
dehumanisation and rights violations and develop a pos-
itive state obligation to counter dehumanisation. Berry
welcomes in this regard that the four treaties reviewed
in her article, the European Convention on Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities and the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, all establish positive state obligations to prevent
hate speech and to foster tolerant societies. Whilst these
obligations should, in theory, allow IHRL monitoring
mechanisms to address dehumanisation, Berry claims
that as it stands the jurisprudence of these mechanisms
remains too vague and general, and does not sufficiently
counter unconscious dehumanisation.
Böcker in her article on ‘Can Non-discrimination Law
Change Hearts and Minds’ explores a question which
has preoccupied sociolegal scholars for ages, namely
whether law, and more particularly non-discrimination
law, can change ‘hearts and minds’. The first part of her
article examines how sociolegal scholars have theorised
about the possibility and desirability of using law as an
instrument of social change. The second part discusses
the findings of empirical research on the social working
of various types of non-discrimination law. Böcker
reviews the extent to which non-discrimination law is
able to create social change, and the factors that influ-
ence this ability. A recurring question is whether this
change concerns only persons’ outward behaviour or
also their hearts and minds. In the end, she concludes
that the research literature does not provide unequivocal
answers. Nevertheless, the overall picture emerging
from the sociolegal literature is that law is generally
more likely to bring about changes in external behav-
iour, whilst attitudes and beliefs are only indirectly
influenced, more particularly by altering the situations
in which attitudes and opinions are formed.
Ioanna Tourkochoriti turns in her article to the related
ethical question ‘How far should the state go to counter
prejudice?’ She discusses the material and immaterial
harm that discriminatory behaviour causes. Discrimi-
nation reinforces a broader context of social power; cau-
ses harm to the social standing of the person, psycholog-
ical harm, economic and physical harm and even exis-
tential harm. All these harms threaten peaceful social
coexistence. For liberals, a state can only intervene with
the actions of a person when there is a risk of harm to
others or a threat to social coexistence. The article dis-
tinguishes between appropriate and non-appropriate
uses of government power. Appropriate uses are those
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which address the reasonable and emotional faculties of
humanity and which encourage sympathetic under-
standing. Research in the areas of behavioural psycholo-
gy, neuroscience and social psychology indicates that it
is possible to bring a change in hearts and minds.
Encouraging a person to adopt the perspective of the
person who has experienced discrimination can lead to
sympathetic understanding. Tourkochoriti con-
sequently claims that it is legitimate for the state to
practice soft paternalism towards changing hearts and
minds in order to prevent behaviour which is discrimi-
natory.
The focus of the conference’s second strand on the time
factor involved is represented by the article of Anton
Kok et al. (Anton Kok, Lwando Xaso, Annelize Steene-
kamp and Michelle Oelofse) on post-apartheid South
Africa. Their article confirms not only the critical
importance of education for strategies of public authori-
ties to change the hearts and minds in relation to preju-
dice and stereotypes but also that this concerns a process
that does not happen overnight but rather takes time,
often several generations. They discuss the struggles in
South Africa to obtain an equal society, with equal
opportunities for all irrespective of racial or ethnic ori-
gin, by zooming in on the way in which the promotion
of equality agenda is realised in the educational setting:
‘The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000: Proposals for Legislative
Reform to Promote Equality through Schools and the
Education System’.
The article starts by highlighting the ways in which the
education system can be used to promote equality in the
context of changing people’s hearts and minds – values,
morals and mindsets. The duties contained in the Pro-
motion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimi-
nation Act 4 of 2000 (‘Equality Act’) bind private and
public schools, educators, learners, governing bodies
and the state. Unfortunately, the part of the Act that
concerns the duty of all actors to promote substantive
equality has not been translated into measurable goals,
and thus remains a dead letter. The authors make con-
crete suggestions as to how an enforceable duty to pro-
mote equality in schools could be fashioned, and what
amendments would need to be made to the Equality Act
to realise this. The authors also reflect on how the duty
to promote equality should then play out practically in
the classroom to facilitate a change in learners’ hearts
and minds.
The conference’s third strand resulted in four articles,
each of which zooms in on one particularly vulnerable
group, victims of systemic discrimination, and the juris-
prudence that can be distilled from several international
human rights supervisory mechanisms concerning posi-
tive state obligations to counter this discrimination and
the related prejudice (in people’s hearts and minds).
The supervisory practice concerned does not explicitly
contain references to ‘changing hearts and minds’, but
several of the positive obligations identified by these
supervisory mechanisms can be seen in this frame.
Lilla Farkas in her article on Roma ‘Positive Obliga-
tions’ Potential to Turn the Tide on Romaphobic Atti-
tudes and Support the Development of “Roma pride”’
analyses the case law and recommendations of inter-
national supervisory mechanisms concerning the educa-
tion and housing of Roma and travellers to assess
whether positive state obligations can be identified to
change the hearts and minds of the majority and pro-
mote minority identities. She highlights a marked dif-
ference in this respect between the jurisprudence on
education on the one hand and the supervisory practice
on housing on the other. The supervisory practice con-
cerning education deals with integration rather than
with cultural specificities, whilst in the context of hous-
ing, it accommodates minority (Roma-specific) needs.
In the latter context, positive obligations are pitched at a
higher level in the sense that majorities are required to
tolerate the minority way of life in overwhelmingly seg-
regated settings. Conversely, in the educational setting,
further legal and institutional reform, as well as a shift
in both majority and minority attitudes, would be neces-
sary to dismantle social distance and generate mutual
trust. Farkas argues that the interlocking factors of
accessibility, judicial activism, European politics,
expectations of political allegiance and community
resources explain jurisprudential developments. The
weak justiciability of minority rights, the lack of
resources internal to the community and dual identities
among the Eastern Roma impede legal claims for cul-
ture-specific accommodation in education. Conversely,
the protection of minority identity and community ties
has gained importance in the housing context, sub-
sumed under the right to private and family life.
Kristin Henrard zooms in on Islamophobia in the West-
ern world. Islamophobia, like xenophobia, points to
deep-seated, ingrained discrimination against a particu-
lar group, whose effective enjoyment of fundamental
rights is impaired. She evaluates the way in which and
the extent to which positive state obligations to counter
Islamophobia become visible in the supervisory practice
of the Human Rights Committee (International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights), the European Court
of Human Rights and the Advisory Committee of the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities. The supervisory practice is analysed in two
steps: The analysis of each international supervisory
mechanism’s practice is, in itself, followed by the com-
parison of the fault lines in these respective supervisory
practices. The latter comparison is structured around
the two main strategies that states can adopt in order to
counter intolerance: On the one hand, the active promo-
tion of tolerance, inter alia through education, aware-
ness-raising campaigns and the stimulation of intercul-
tural dialogue; and on the other, countering acts
informed by intolerance, in terms of the prohibition of
discrimination (and/or the effective enjoyment of sub-
stantive fundamental rights). Overall, a rather mixed
record emerges, as well as considerable scope for clarifi-
cation of positive state obligations to counter Islamo-
phobia. In terms of the active promotion of tolerance,
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minority-specific rights provisions are more developed,
in comparison with the general fundamental rights (also
those concerning education). In this respect, various
possibilities to engage in systematic interpretation are
identified. The supervisory practice regarding counter-
ing acts of intolerance and discrimination reveals that
when international supervisory mechanisms do not have
a strong base line protection against interferences with
fundamental rights, it is essential that an Islamophobic
context is factored in explicitly in the human rights
analysis. Such a context should then trigger heightened
scrutiny for the freedom of religion as well as an explicit
non-discrimination analysis.
Alina Tryfonidou explores the range of positive state
obligations that can be identified in order to provide
sexual minorities with substantive equal access to and
enjoyment of a range of fundamental rights: ‘Positive
state obligations under European law: A tool for achiev-
ing substantive equality for sexual minorities in
Europe’. She underscores that the law should respect
and protect all sexualities and diverse intimate relation-
ships without discrimination. For this purpose, the law
needs to ensure that not only can sexual minorities be
free from state interference when expressing their sex-
uality in private but that they should also be given the
right to express their sexuality in public and to have
their intimate relationships legally recognised. In addi-
tion, sexual minorities should be protected from the
actions of other individuals, when these violate their
legal and fundamental human rights. Tryfonidou joins
the preceding two authors in their assessment that there
is substantial scope for improvement regarding the
identification of positive state obligations that can con-
tribute to changing the hearts and minds of people.
According to Tryfonidou, European law should not wait
for hearts and minds to change before imposing addi-
tional positive obligations, especially since this gives the
impression that the European Union (EU) and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are con-
doning or disregarding persistent discrimination against
sexual minorities.
Finally, Andrea Broderick delves into positive obliga-
tions to counter stereotypes and ensure inclusive equali-
ty for people with disabilities: ‘Ensuring Slow but
Steady Transformations in Hearts and Minds concern-
ing People with Disabilities: Viewing the UN Treaty
Bodies and the Strasbourg Court through the Lens of
Inclusive Equality’. She underscores that the entry into
force of the CRPD pushed state obligations to counter
prejudice and stereotypes concerning people with disa-
bilities to the forefront of international human rights
law. The CRPD is underpinned by a model of inclusive
equality, which views disability as a social construct that
results from the interaction between persons with
impairments and barriers, including attitudinal barriers,
that hinder their participation in society. The recogni-
tion dimension of inclusive equality, together with the
CRPD’s provisions on awareness raising, mandates that
state parties target prejudice and stereotypes about the
capabilities and contributions of persons with disabili-
ties to society. She shows that certain human rights
treaty bodies, including the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and, to a much lesser extent,
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, require states to eradicate harmful ster-
eotypes and prejudice about people with disabilities in
various forms of ‘interpersonal’ relationships. The
CRPD Committee goes beyond legal measures and
focuses strongly on awareness-raising and training
measures aimed at removing attitudinal barriers that are
at the core of the marginalisation of people with disabili-
ties. A further differentiation is made in relation to the
ECtHR, in the sense that notwithstanding its recogni-
tion that the CRPD embraces a European and world-
wide consensus on the need to protect people with disa-
bilities from discriminatory treatment, the Court has –
unfortunately – wavered in its approach to positive state
duties to tackle stereotypes and prejudice.
Concluding Observations
Throughout the conference, and the resulting articles, a
recurring point was made about the fact that law can
never be enough when aiming to change peoples’ hearts
and minds. Law can set out to steer behaviour, but can
it really change the former? There is no straightforward
answer to this sociological question. It could be argued
that when the law is successful in steering behaviour, it
will over time also become successful in changing hearts
and minds. Nevertheless, in certain respects, the ideas
and minds may change sooner than the actual behav-
iour. Also in this regard, change requires time.
The ethical constraints identified by Tourkochoriti
could also explain why international supervisory
mechanisms so far have not developed a strong and
coherent supervisory practice pertaining to positive state
obligations to counter prejudice and stereotypes, and
ultimately to change the hearts and minds. The four
articles evaluating the international supervisory practice
have revealed a mixed record. To be sure, supervisory
bodies identify positive state obligations, several of
which can be related to changing the hearts and minds,
but there are significant divergencies. Overall, consider-
able work can and still needs to be done in order to
arrive at a coherent body of supervisory practice that
can be translated into concrete action at the domestic
level.9 The importance of education, and more
particularly education of different groups together, and
of awareness-raising campaigns is highlighted through-
out the special issue, as well as the often decisive role of
civil society in the latter respect. Full and equal inclu-
sion and participation of all ‘vulnerable’ groups in
society is at the same time a goal and a means in regard
to ‘changing the hearts and minds’ so as to eradicate
prejudice and stereotypes.
9. See also E. Brems and A. Timmer, ‘Introduction’, in E. Brems and A.
Timmer (eds.), Stereotypes and Human Rights Law, Antwerp, Intersen-
tia (2016), at 4.
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